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I. Introduction 
 In 1774, James Wilson publicly posed a question regarding the nature of British liberty: 
“Is British freedom denominated from the soil, or from the people of Britain?” He asked, “If 
from the latter, do they lose it by quitting the soil?  Do those, who embark, freemen, in Great 
Britain, disembark slaves, in America?”1  Wilson wrote these words privately in a 1768 pamphlet 
titled “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British 
Parliament” and in it, he denied British Parliamentary authority to legislate for the North 
American British Colonies in all circumstances.  Wilson was one of the first to argue that no 
colonist granted political or constitutional authority to Parliament.  In the second decade of the 
twenty first century, one could think that a study of James Wilson and the American Revolution 
is passé.  Historians have discussed Wilson’s ideology at length over the years and have placed 
him in the minority of the Revolutionaries and delegates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention 
due to his ardent defense of a national constitutionalism and his adherence to Natural Law.  
However, this essay argues that the time is ripe for an examination of Wilson’s political and 
constitutional theory in light of new research on the origin and promise of the Revolution and 
how American Whigs viewed the separation from Great Britain.  Wilson’s political speeches, 
papers, and writings during the American Revolution represent an indictment of the British 
Parliament rooted in the Anglo-American customary constitution that the Whigs traced back to 
Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) and the 1688 Glorious Revolution.  This Anglo-American 
constitution differed significantly from the one claimed by a sovereign and supreme Parliament 
during the revolutionary crisis.  While most monographs on Wilson’s political and constitutional 
thought focus on his Scottish Enlightenment and Natural Law influences, this essay asserts the 
                                                
1 James Wilson, The Collected Works of James Wilson, eds. Mark David Hall & Kermit Hall, 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007), 16.  
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equal importance of the Anglo-American customary constitution in shaping Wilson’s political 
thought for popular elections during the Constitutional Convention.  As demonstrated in the third 
section of this essay, Wilson’s position at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 gave him a 
platform to incorporate the Anglo-American customary constitution in the law of the land. 
II. Historiography 
James Wilson 
 Historical literature written about Wilson’s influence during the American Revolutionary 
and Constitutional eras is not as wide and deep as it is for other figures from the revolutionary 
and founding eras.  Those interested in the study of Colonial Whigs should note, however, that 
several informative monographs on Wilson and his life exist, as well as specific works that 
address his political ideology and the ideas embodied in his 1791-92 Lectures on the Law that he 
delivered at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. 
 In 1956, historian Charles Page Smith published the most expansive biography of 
Wilson.2  The Smith biography provided an extended look at the life of Wilson from his 
childhood in Scotland, his reduced stature in debtor’s prison, and the events surrounding his 
death.  Wilson scholar Mark David Hall hailed Smith’s book as the ultimate biography of 
Wilson’s life, but some scholars believe that Smith’s depiction of Wilson’s life in Scotland to 
contain embellishments.  For example, in 2013 Martin Clagett penned an essay that corrected 
some of Smith’s errors in light of new scholarship that appeared after Smith completed his book.  
Clagett suggested that relatively little biographical information exists on the formative years of 
Wilson’s life and cautioned readers that to according to his reading of Wilson’s life, Smith drew 
                                                
2 Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798 (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1956).  
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from few letters in an expansive way that might call the entire section about Wilson’s early 
childhood into question.3 
 Mark David Hall researched the legal philosophy of Wilson in The Political and Legal 
Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798 and published his work in 1996.  Hall maintained that 
Wilson’s engagement with the Scottish Enlightenment influenced his ideas about morality and 
national government.  Hall called his book the first systematic study of Wilson’s moral 
epistemology and he provided a helpful historiography on Wilson.  Hall criticized Jean Marc 
Pascal’s The Political Ideas of James Wilson for disorganization and a lack of analysis while he 
argued that a discussion of the connections between Wilson’s political activity and theory was 
absent from Geoffrey Seed’s James Wilson, Founding Father.4  Hall relied upon the law lectures 
to defend his thesis and his organized approach revealed how Wilson the legal philosopher 
viewed the role of the individual in the pursuit of truth and law in pursuit of morality.  Hall 
dedicated a couple of chapters to Wilson’s participation in the Constitutional Convention and his 
understanding of the people that inhabited the United State existed as a single entity.5  Hall’s 
book served as an impressive means to understanding the Natural Law and Scottish 
Enlightenment influences on Wilson’s thought.  
 James H. Read contrasted the political philosophies of Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Wilson in Power Versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, 
and Jefferson.  In this work, Read stated that Wilson’s “greatest contribution came at the Federal 
                                                
3 Martin Clagett, “James Wilson-His Scottish Background: Corrections and Additions,” 
Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 79 (2012): 151. 
4 Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798, (Columbia, 
MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 4.  
5 “The people” defined as white, male, property-owners over the age of 21.  
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convention, where his influence in shaping the final document was “second only to Madison’s.”6  
Read’s study of Wilson revealed an ideology that included nationalistic ideas akin to those of 
Hamilton and democratic ones akin to Jefferson.  When compared to Madison, Wilson had a 
weak record on civil liberties due to his stalwart opposition to a bill of rights in the Constitution.  
However, it ought to be noted that Madison’s support for a bill of rights was a result of his 
political maneuvering to build consensus for the Constitution’s adoption.  Regardless of this 
point, Read argued that Wilson’s poor record on civil liberties made “Wilson’s keenest insights 
only partial truths. This applies to the problem of reconciling the power of government with the 
liberty of citizens.”7  According to Read, the fundamental argument made by Wilson was that the 
constitutional argument of the American Revolution placed the sovereignty in the people, not in 
either the state or national governments, but that this argument was not enough to protect 
liberty.8  This argument is flawed, as it does not give a full understanding of Wilson’s own 
disposition that elections were superior to a bill of rights in protecting civil liberties. 
 A University of Louisville master’s thesis authored by Bradley Jay Caffee is one of the 
most recent pieces of scholarship about Wilson.  Caffee argued that Wilson espoused a 
“progressive” view of the revolutionary and constitutional experiences and that his ideas held a 
special place in American thought for laying a foundation for “moral and civil progress.”9  
Although Wilson maintained a view of humanity that allowed for improvement, it is debatable as 
to whether or not “progressive” is the proper term to describe Wilson during the Revolution and 
Constitutional Convention.  The word “progressive” contains many connotations including that 
                                                
6 James Read, Power Versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson (Charlottesville, 
VA: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 92. 
7 Ibid., 115. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Bradley Jay Caffee, “James Wilson: Progressive Constitutionalist,” (M.A. Thesis – University 
of Louisville, 2003), 4.  
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of the progressive reform movement of the 1920’s and of contemporary liberalism.  By the time 
that Wilson delivered his law lectures at the University of Pennsylvania, he may have realized 
that the ideas embodied in the revolutionary ideology were progressive in the sense that they 
were forward-looking.  However, it is important to try to suppress the temptation to write history 
with the mindset of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and instead to understand the 
Revolutionary crisis as the American Whigs, and Wilson, understood it.  Caffee dedicated an 
entire chapter to Wilson’s work during the Revolution, but only briefly discussed Wilson’s ideas 
in the context of the Anglo-American customary constitution.  Wilson’s 1768 pamphlet on 
parliamentary authority in the colonies voiced the intention of the revolutionaries to maintain 
British liberty as it had existed traditionally in the colonies and abstained from defining a 
different liberty for a new age. 
The Revolutionary & Constitutional Eras 
 Historians have always been interested in the values and ideas of the Revolutionary and 
Constitutional generations.  Immediately after the end of the Revolution, a Massachusetts 
royalist by the name of Peter Oliver wrote The Origin and Progress of the American Rebellion.10  
In using the word “rebellion,” Oliver revealed his position on the nature of the controversy 
between the British Empire and her colonies and portrayed Massachusetts Royal Governor 
Thomas Hutchison, a favorite target of many Whigs, in a sympathetic light.  Although Oliver’s 
account makes for an interesting read, the modern study of the Revolution and Constitution 
arrived in the nineteenth century with the publication of George Bancroft’s multivolume history.  
Then in the economic uncertainty that appeared in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
economic despair coincided with the advent of determinist historians who forced the 
                                                
10 Peter Oliver, Peter Oliver’s Origin & Progress of the American Rebellion: A Tory View, 
Douglass Adair & John A. Shutz, eds., (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961). 
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revolutionary and constitutional experience through a narrow economic lens.  One of the best 
examples of a historical work that falls under this category is Charles Beard’s 1913 book An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.  The desire of Beard and other 
progressive historians of the era for social and economic reform programs shaped their view that 
economic factors motivated the movements for the Revolution and Constitution.11  Wilson 
suffered numerous financial difficulties and was consistently in debt through his life because of 
his investments in western land speculation.  As Caffee pointed out, if Beard had studied 
Wilson’s poor financial planning alongside his support for popular elections, he might have 
realized that at least one figure at the Convention went entirely against his argument that the sole 
purpose of the Constitution was to benefit the upper class.12 
 In the period that followed the entry of the United States into the Second World War, a 
group of new historians began to pick away at the economic arguments of progressive era 
historians.  The study of the American Revolution experienced its own revolution with the 
publication of Bernard Bailyn’s 1967 Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.13  This 
book was the product of Bailyn’s analysis of a study of pamphlets published during the 
Revolution.  He emphasized the importance of taking authors of revolutionary pamphlets at their 
word, and interpreted the American Revolution as being motivated by a flood of opposition 
thought from England over the course of the seventeenth century.  According to Bailyn, the 
Whigs, or the oppositionist group, were opposed to taxation without representation and were 
hell-bent on maintaining the liberties their forefathers held in England.  Bailyn credited the 
                                                
11 Roy N. Lokken, “The Political Theory of the American Revolution: Changing Interpretations,” 
The History Teacher 8 (1974): 94. 
12 Caffee, 8.   
13 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1967). 
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philosophies of social contract thinkers, Enlightenment philosophes, and English common law 
lawyers as factors that shaped the thought of American Revolutionary leaders, but he held that a 
tradition of British oppositionist politics bound the group together.  A year later he published The 
Origin of American Politics in which he called political papers and pamphlets the best primary 
sources for understanding the thought of American Whigs, as they provided “clarity” to the 
“political responses of the time.”14  He affirmed his earlier assertion in Ideological Origins that a 
comprehensive view of the colonial mind could only be understood through the opposition 
ideology that trickled into the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
offered Cato’s Letters as an example of one work that shaped colonial logic.15  
 Bailyn also argued that the goal of the American Revolution was not to create new social 
relationships and institutions, or “a world entirely new” as Alexis de Tocqueville stated, but that 
the central goal of the American Revolution was the “preservation of political liberty,” as the 
colonists had historically understood the word “liberty.”16  It is important to remember that the 
context of the 1960’s shaped Bailyn’s scholarship, though in a different way from that of the 
progressive school that preceded him.  His argument that the American Revolution did not seek 
to develop new social relationships ought to be viewed in the context of the social change in 
which he wrote.  Bailyn’s critics are quick to raise this point, and are correct to do so as long as 
they maintain that the issue of historiographical context extends to all historians.  Regardless, 
Bailyn’s work is important for igniting a new generation of scholarship on the revolutionary and 
the constitutional experience, and his scholarship allowed colonials to speak for themselves 
through their own pamphlets, speeches, and papers.   
                                                
14 Bailyn, The Origin of American Politics (New York, NY: Knopf, 1968), 19. 
15 Ibid., 40-45. 
16 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 1, James T. Schleifer, ed., 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010), 14; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 19. 
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 A wave of scholars reacted to Bailyn’s work and strengthened his interpretation.  The 
new school earned the title of a “republican consensus” for its insistence that power of ideas was 
the catalyst of the Revolution.17  Indeed, J.G.A. Pocock’s 1975 book, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition, traced values of 
republicanism and virtue back to Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy in order to argue that country 
politicians and landed aristocracy who lived in the Virginia colony inherited those thoughts.  
Pocock agreed with Bailyn in the importance of Cato’s Letters on the transmission of fears about 
the encroachments of royal power on the liberty of the people to British North America.  Added 
to this fear was the perception of corruption, which dominated the ideas of Whig leaders who 
believed that George III, royal minsters, and Parliament waged a war against colonial liberty.18  
Gordon S. Wood bolstered the foundation created by Bailyn and agreed in The Creation of the 
American Republic that the key to understanding the American Revolution was through the lens 
of oppositionist political theory.19  Wood emphasized, too, the importance of Cato’s Letters to 
American Whigs.  The publication of books with the republican-consensus is still being 
conducted today.  Jack N. Rakove published the Pulitzer Prize-winning Original Meanings in 
1997, a book that walked readers through the happenings of the Constitutional Convention and 
focused on the role of James Madison as he solidified support for the document.  Rakove made 
                                                
17 Colin Gordon, “Crafting a Usable Past: Consensus, Ideology, and Historians of the American 
Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 46 (1989): 672.  
18 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republic Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 474. 
19 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press).  
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his way through the arguments at the convention to find “the middle ground” between the “ideas 
or interests” feud that emerged between historians of this area of United States history.20  
 Legal history is a growing field within early colonial and United States history, although 
its rightful place in the conversation about the ideas and values of the American Revolution is 
murky.  Legal historian and New York University School of Law Professor John Phillip Reid 
took an interest in the legal foundations of the American Revolution and Constitution after 
reading that Bailyn believed that “law was irrelevant to the making of the Revolution.”21  Reid 
argued that law was indeed relevant in his four-volume Constitutional History of the American 
Revolution, but his scholarship has not received the widespread recognition it deserves.  Reid is 
one of the most prolific authors on the study of the American Revolutionary era as his 
Constitutional History spans the authorities of rights, taxation, legislation, and law.  The volumes 
on authorities of law and legislation provided critical analysis in understanding the Colonial 
Whig arguments levied at Parliament and the King.  He has also completed a monograph on the 
subject of liberty in the eighteenth century. 
 In his 1981 book, In Defiance of the Law: The Standing Army Controversy, the Two 
Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution, Reid stated that the field of the 
American Revolution cannot be understood as a misinterpretation of a single constitution, but as 
a crisis of two constitutions: one of traditional customary colonial relations to the monarchy and 
parliament and another, newer constitution of parliamentary supremacy.22  Reid applied this idea 
                                                
20 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997), 15. 
21 Hendrick Hartog & William E. Nelson, Law as Culture and Culture as Law: Essays in Honor 
of John Phillip Reid (Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers, 2000), 5.  
22 John Phillip Reid, In Defiance of the Law: The Standing Army Controversy, The Two 
Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1981).  
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of two constitutions to the deployment of a standing army in Boston and demonstrated that 
colonial references to the “constitution” fell on the deaf ears of King George III, the royal 
ministry, and Parliament.  With the passage of the 1766 Declaratory Act, the disciples of 
parliamentary command assured themselves of supremacy in in all legislative matters.  Most 
colonials acknowledged parliamentary supremacy over the monarch, but they did not respect a 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy that exceeded the traditional limits of authority towards the 
colonies and provided justification for the deployment of a standing army in Boston Harbor.  On 
the point of the influence of natural law on the Revolution’s political theory, Reid reiterated 
another one of his arguments: that the arguments about the constitution during the Revolution 
were “[m]ore Cokean than Lockean, more common law than natural law.”23  Reid asserted that 
the driving forces behind the Revolution were law, constitutionalism, and the birthrights of free 
men in the British Empire.   
 The accusation that earlier historians supplanted Coke’s influence with Locke’s on the 
Revolutionary generation is not new.  David Thomas Konig called Coke’s legal theory on 
common-law constitutionalism “an article of faith” in forming Madison’s understanding of 
constitutionalism two hundred years later.24  Other scholars have remarked that Coke’s influence 
extended to several leaders of the Revolution including James Otis, Samuel and John Adams, 
John Dickenson, and James Wilson.25  Charles Mullet called James Wilson the revolutionary 
leader that was most familiar with Coke.26  
                                                
23 Reid, Defiance, 35.  
24 David Thomas Konig, “James Madison and Common-Law Constitutionalism,” Law and 
History Review 28 (2010): 511.  
25 Charles F. Mullet, “Coke and the American Revolution,” Economica 38 (1932): 468-470.  
26 Ibid., 470. See also Ellis Sandoz, The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, 
and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008).  
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 Reid conducted a linguistic study of the word “liberty” in a thin volume titled, The 
Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution.27  To the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century colonial, liberty was procedural in nature and grounded in processes located in the legal 
system.  Reid named a few sources for this liberty, including “custom, original contract, 
constitutional principle, ownership, inheritance, and, to a minor extent, natural law.”28  This book 
modified the ideas of Bailyn, who described the Revolution as the offspring of oppositionist 
thought and those who placed more emphasis on the liberty of the European Enlightenment.  
Reid contended that the chief motivation of the American Revolution was the infraction upon 
this legal or political liberty embodied in the common law constitutionalism that colonials and 
their ancestors had known for centuries in the colonies.  The threat to liberty came from within 
and from outside the colonies.  The eighteenth century mind believed that if order and liberty 
were left unbalanced that liberty could quickly slip into license, a corruption of true liberty.  Yet 
this balance was tenuous: an excess of order could slip into an arbitrary exercise of power and 
power always coveted and encroached upon liberty’s territory.  This external threat found its 
home in rhetoric referring to arbitrary government and slavery.29  
 Reid’s volume on the authority of law summarized the legal arguments that led to the 
divergence of constitutional theory that occurred between Parliament and the North American 
British Colonies.  Parliament sought a parliamentary solution to the colonial problem.  Had King 
George granted royal sanction to the colonial assemblies and permitted co-equal status with 
                                                
27 Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1988).  
28 Ibid., 23.  
29 Ibid., 32. Reid referred to the eighteenth century notion of “civil liberty” as a means of 
understanding the liberty that American Whigs referenced in their pamphlets and speeches. On 
the word “slavery,” Reid pointed out the clear contradiction in the colonial claim about political 
enslavement and the use of race-based slave labor in the South.  
 Southard 13 
Parliament, he increased the power of the throne and diminished parliamentary power.30  
Completing the logic presented by Parliament’s rejection of a solution preferred by the colonies 
revealed a fear held by many colonists: the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy placed the 
Britons in England above the Britons in America.31  This volume detailed how the liberty issue 
raised by the colonists was tied to other matters of security and representation.  All of these 
issues appeared in the argument that denied parliamentary supremacy over colonial affairs.  
 In the volume on the authority of legislation in Constitutional History, Reid offered a 
new argument into academic discussion regarding the origin of the controversy between the 
colonies and Parliament.32  This volume differed from the view that portrayed the Revolution as 
the result of a tax disagreement and took the position that the real rub appeared when Parliament 
forced its right to legislate to the front of the crisis.33  He lobbed a series of criticisms at other 
historians in the field for having misplaced and focused on arguments provided through John 
Locke, social contract, and natural law theory.  According to Reid, there is little to no evidence 
that those arguments appealed to Colonial Whigs; he argued that such arguments ought to be 
rejected and replaced with arguments and ideas grounded in the British constitution.34  
Furthermore, Reid argued that the Whigs worried their parliamentary counterparts when the 
colonists rejected parliament’s position and looked to King George for redress.  To the observer 
in England, it looked as if the American Whigs were asking to relitigate the constitutional 
arrangement of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
                                                
30 Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Law (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 166-168.  
31 Ibid., 76-78.  
32 Jack P. Greene, “John Phillip Reid and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution,” in 
Law As Culture & Culture As Law, 55.  
33 Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 5.  
34 Ibid. 
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 Though on its face Reid’s argument about the nature of the Revolutionary controversy 
suggested that he agreed with the republican consensus forged by Bailyn and his disciples, some 
scholars believe that his work departed from the consensus school in a significant way.  Jack P. 
Greene offered a possible reason for the lack of acceptance of Reid’s historical scholarship in 
that Reid’s argument “suggests that that the revolution that occurred between 1760 and 1783 was 
a British revolution that has to be understood as an episode in British imperial history.”35  This 
reason might be why Reid’s scholarship has not received a warm reception – as he argued 
against those who understood the American Revolution as a uniquely American event.  To 
simplify what Reid argued across the body of his work, the Revolution was the product of an 
incredibly British legal and constitutional crisis that, hinging on different definitions of the same 
words, ultimately became too legal for the two sides to reach an amicable conclusion.  
 Historians such as Bailyn, Wood, and Reid are incredibly skilled in their ability to 
provide a vast amount of content with a stunning amount of primary source material.  However, 
these historians risk leaving the human element out of the historical narrative.  Peter Hoffer 
discussed this point extensively in The Salem Witch Trials: A Legal History and called for 
historians to be wary of equating change with a sudden burst of social and cultural momentum 
due to abstract ideas.  Hoffer remarked that, “if, in the end, we regard complex human beings as 
mere pawns of powerful cultural forces, [historians] lose all sense of the importance of choice 
and contingency.”36  Indeed, historians are called to tell how change occurred and in order to 
describe social change, some historians lose sight of individual actors that move the wheels of 
history.  However, according to Bailyn, one of the difficult aspects of historical writing is 
                                                
35 Greene, Law as Culture and Culture as Law, 56. 
36 Peter Charles Hoffer, The Salem Witch Trials: A Legal History (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1997), 6. 
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striking a proper balance between viewing historical change from the vantage point of the 
twenty-first century with the motivations rooted in the context of the time that historians are 
analyzing.37  To this end, this study of James Wilson seeks to place his constitutional arguments 
of the American Revolution in the wider contextual history of the Revolutionary and 
Constitutional eras.  
Overlooking Wilson 
 Several reasons exist why historians and political scientists overlook Wilson in their 
studies of the late eighteenth century.  Chief among those reasons is the lack of primary sources 
available to those interested.  Some personal papers lie at the University of Pennsylvania, but not 
many.  A survey of Thomas Jefferson’s papers revealed that Wilson wrote to Jefferson a few 
times and mostly about mundane matters, such as to suggest the appointment of a fellow 
Pennsylvanian for a clerical position.38  Hamilton’s papers contained a letter that Hamilton wrote 
to Wilson in which he solicited the latter’s support in building unanimous consensus for George 
Washington’s election as president.39  Apart from that letter, Hamilton mentioned Wilson 
numerous times in salary reports for the national government and once to James Madison, where 
he penned that “Wilson [was] evidently out of the question” in terms of his qualifications for a 
position in the executive branch being created at that time.40  Such letters are not that helpful in 
revealing what Wilson’s peers thought about his legal and Whig thought.  It is known, however, 
that John Adams lauded Wilson’s intellectual capacities to his wife Abigail in a letter and that 
                                                
37 See Bailyn, “Context in History” in Sometimes an Art: Nine Essays on History (New York, 
NY: Knopf, 2015).  
38 James Wilson to Thomas Jefferson, August 13, 1790, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. 
Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), Vol. 17, 354.    
39 Alexander Hamilton to James Wilson, January 25, 1798, in The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton, eds. Harold Syrett, Jacob Cooke (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961), 
Vol. 5, 247-249. 
40 Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, Nov. 23, 1788, Vol. 5, 236-237. 
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George Washington thought Wilson so qualified in terms of legal skills that he forced his 
nephew Bushrod to study law under him.41  
 The entirety of Wilson’s political and philosophical writings and speeches are contained 
in two volumes compiled in 2007 by biographer Mark David Hall and scholar Kermit L. Hall.  
This edition stands as the most comprehensive edition of Wilson’s writings to date and includes 
recently discovered manuscript notes in the law lectures that Wilson delivered in the 1790’s.  
Other factors contributing to Wilson’s lower status among the founders of the United States 
might be due to his diminished reputation near the end of his life.  Although he rose to become 
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Wilson increasingly dealt with a 
staggering amount of debt that landed him in several debtors’ prisons.42  Hall also attributed 
Wilson’s “relative obscurity” to the fact that he sat on the Supreme Court “at a time when there 
was little business before that body.”43  In addition, the field of historical scholarship regarding 
the American Revolution by and large concerns itself with the triumph of Jeffersonian idealism 
over Federalist thought.  However, consensus exists among historians and political scientists that 
the shadows of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison have eclipsed Wilson’s legacy.44  
                                                
41 Hall, The Political Philosophy of James Wilson, 13, 19. 
42 Hall, Collected Works, xvi, xxv. According to Hall, Wilson is “the only justice of the Supreme 
Court imprisoned for debt.”  Wilson was imprisoned for his debts in New Jersey and South 
Carolina.  He was released from jail in South Carolina, but soon caught malaria and died a year 
later. For the history of debt imprisonment in the United States see Peter J. Coleman, Debtors 
and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900, 
(Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 1974); Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: 
Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002). 
43 Hall, “James Wilson,” America’s Forgotten Founders, eds. Hall & Gregg (Wilmington, DE: 
2011), 32.  
44 Ibid., 167. The poll conducted by Hall and Gregg among historians and political scientists 
ranked Wilson as the number one most forgotten founder, and he earned 214 points, which 
placed him 62 points above the second-most forgotten founder, George Mason.  
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 A tendency also exists for the modern mind and popular culture to reduce complicated 
subjects to simple binary comparisons.  Numerous examples of this problem exist including the 
differing visions of the republic offered by Hamilton and Jefferson, the positions taken during 
the ratification of the Constitution by the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and contemporary 
debates that occur between Democrats and Republicans.  More often people situate themselves 
and their ideas along a spectrum.  This problem of binary history leads to a non-nuanced view of 
the past and of figures that might not fit into one faction or another.  Others might suggest that 
Wilson’s Natural Law influences are responsible for his political thought – this essay does not 
dispute that.  It would be an error to reduce Wilson to the product of one intellectual influence – 
whether those influence were rooted in the Anglo-American customary constitutionalism, the 
Scottish Enlightenment, or the body of Natural Law.  Page Smith called Wilson “an enigma,” 
and an enigma cannot be forced into a binary comparison with another figure from the founding 
or reduced to one strain of thought.45 
 In light of the research completed on the values associated with the American Revolution 
in the last fifty years, it is time to examine how Wilson interpreted the constitutional controversy 
that emerged in the 1760’s.  This essay argues that Wilson’s understanding of Anglo-American 
customary British constitutionalism ought to solidify his place at the pantheon of America’s 
revered leaders during this critical time during the American Revolution and Constitutional 
periods.  
III.  Mixed Government and Sovereignty: The Anglo-American Constitution  
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 In order to demonstrate Wilson’s place in Anglo-American constitutional history, an 
effort must be made to define the tradition that he appealed to in the 1760’s.  In this case one 
could do worse than to quote legal historian John Phillip Reid who stated that “it will not do well 
to think of John Locke” in a discussion of the legal influences on the pre-revolutionary Whigs.46  
Indeed the crisis was a constitutional one of two constitutions. The first was the constitution of 
the customary rights of Englishmen expounded by Sir Edward Coke against the encroachments 
of the royal prerogative by Charles I (1600-1649).  The second, newer constitution, broke from 
that customary tradition that existed before the 1688 Glorious Revolution and embraced a 
doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy.  The customary constitution and English law, especially 
the Common Law, was the “framework” for the American Whig argument.47  Colonials utilized 
Coke’s resistance to the sovereignty of a branch of government during their constitutional crisis 
against the encroaching nature of the British Parliament.  This indictment created “a 
constitutional tension” in during the age of the American Revolution.48  Coke’s exchange with 
Charles I, the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England and America, and the English Bill of Rights 
(1689) place Wilson’s 1768 pamphlet “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the 
Legislative Authority of the British Parliament” in the appropriate context that he referenced: the 
customary constitution of mixed government. 
Sir Edward Coke, Sovereignty & the Case of the Five Knights 
 While the British colonists in North America struggled to adapt to the environment of the 
New World, Englishmen in the mother country began questioning King Charles I’s claim of 
divine right.  The Case of the Five Knights (1627) displayed the doctrine of divine right in its 
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full: for “reasons of state” the King and his men argued, Charles I held the authority to deny 
habeas corpus.49  This royal argument made many uncomfortable in Parliament as for all 
practical purposes, Charles had declared martial law without consent from the representative 
assembly.  In response to this act and under the leadership of Coke, the Parliament drafted a 
document entitled The Petition of Right (1628).  The Petition marked a major affirmation of the 
traditional liberties of Englishmen against the encroaching power of an unlimited monarch.  
Called “the most valuable document to limit royal power since the Magna Carta,” the Petition 
rattled off the rights of Englishmen as the House of Commons and Lords understood those rights 
historically.50  Among these affirmed liberties were habeas corpus, due process of law, and 
numerous provisions that sustained the role of Parliament in providing consent in the mixed 
constitutional order for matters of taxation and legislation.  In the committee of the whole house, 
Coke read the petition aloud and stated “whereas by the common law and statutes every free man 
has a propriety in his goods and his estate, as no tax, tallage, etc., nor any soldier can be billete in 
his house . . . by the King or any minister without an act of parliament.”51  Just as important as 
the Petition itself was an amendment proposed during parliamentary debate that protected the 
sovereignty of the crown.  Coke convinced the lower house to reject the language.52  When 
Charles learned of the bill and its contents, he demurred and it was not clear as to if he accepted 
the Petition as law.   The monarch directed the Commons to reaffirm the Magna Carta.  The 
Commons and the Lords confronted him, and read the Petition to him, and he agreed to it.  This 
petition could be cited in the age of the American Revolution by both supporters of 
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Parliamentary supremacy and the Anglo-American customary constitution; the former saw the 
Petition as a means to increase Parliament’s authority over the crown, while the latter saw it as a 
means to protect the liberties of Englishmen.  Coke’s contributions to English law extended also 
to the field of legal scholarship with the publication of his Institutes on the Law, where he 
combined legal statutes and charters with analysis.  Coke’s actions created more precedent for 
this mixed common law constitutional tradition; however, these efforts to affirm Parliamentary 
authority put Parliament and the King on a path to a brutal civil war.53  After the end of the 
English Civil War, Parliament restored the monarchy and Charles’ son took the throne as Charles 
II.  Charles II governed like his father before him and Parliament faced multiple skirmishes to 
retain its authority.  This experience extended to the North American colonies, where the 
implementation of a royal plan to control the colonies threatened the existence of the colonial 
assemblies.  Under Charles II and later during the reign of his brother James II, the crown ignited 
a systematic abolition of customary colonial assemblies and traditions.  These events led to the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 and shaped the English and colonial mindsets in a way that 
foreshadowed the response to royal power in the colonies in the late eighteenth century.  
The Colonial Experience & The Glorious Revolution 
 During the reign of James I and Charles I, the monarchs granted numerous land grants 
and charters to colonize America.  The colonization of the New World was still in its infancy.54  
The colonies organized themselves, and as Michael Kammen has pointed out, often formed 
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colonial assemblies to govern their affairs.55  For example, individuals with interest in the joint-
stock colony of Virginia formed an assembly called the House of Burgess as early as 1619 to 
raise funds in the community for a small militia to ward off Native Americans and for the 
construction of roads and bridges. 56  Five years later the colony was reorganized as a crown 
colony under James I and established a royal governor and a governor’s council to govern 
alongside the House of Burgess.  As time passed in the North American British colonies, similar 
systems formed following the precedent set by the Virginia Colony.57  The colonists revered 
these colonial assemblies and attached themselves to the ideal of delegate – or actual – 
representation in dealing with matters in their locality.  Over the course of the next few decades, 
England turned inward to deal with troubles at home under the rule of Charles I and legal 
skirmishes over the royal prerogative and parliamentary authority, a fight that erupted into the 
English Civil War (1642-1651).  Protestant Oliver Cromwell established a military dictatorship 
to oversee English affairs in 1651, but struggled to rule.  His attempt to make the Protectorate a 
hereditary form of government failed and the British Parliament restored the throne to Charles II 
in 1660.  Charles appointed his younger brother James as Duke of York to handle colonial affairs 
and James oversaw the direction of colonial governors.  A colonial governor served at the 
Duke’s request and under James’ instructions allowed colonists to form representative colonial 
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assemblies with upper and lower houses and policy-making ability for those bodies provided that 
the governor and James approved it.58  
 One of the clearest articulations of colonial duties and expectations resided in one of the 
first declarations in New York’s General Assembly in 1683.  The colonists in the lower house 
drafted and approved a Charter of Libertyes and Privileges, where the assembly claimed that 
only the General Assembly could approve taxes in the colony and that the body was 
“Supreme.”59  Following the established legislative process outlined in the Duke’s instructions to 
royal Governor Thomas Dongan, the Charter was passed, Dongan signed it, the Duke approved 
it, and sent it to Charles II where the royal ministry contended over the proclamation’s contents 
before adopting a more strict administration in 1686.60   Charles established the Dominion of 
New England and centralized control of the area under one governor and began snatching up 
charters from New York to Massachusetts Bay.  He dismissed Parliament, which angered 
Englishmen at home.  However, he died in February 1685 and the Duke of York ascended to the 
throne and appointed Edmund Andros, a loyal advisor, to govern New England in 1686.  Andros 
irritated the colonists further by denying them the ability to pass laws for themselves and 
tensions between the royal government and colonists exacerbated.  The polices adopted by 
Andros incensed the inhabitants of Boston, Massachusetts.  
 James’ ascension was not without controversy - an illegitimate child of Charles II, the 
Protestant Duke James of Monmouth - contested his rule in 1685.  After James and his 
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supporters crushed the royal challenge, he suspended Parliament like his father and brother 
before him.  He repeatedly distributed the Declaration of Indulgence (1687), a document that 
provided religious tolerations for Catholics and circumvented Parliament’s fierce Protestantism.  
These acts smacked of monarchical tyranny.  The ousted representatives sought a remedy to their 
problem, found a solution in James’ Protestant relatives William and Mary of Orange, and 
invited them to the English throne.  James and his supporters launched a propaganda war while 
William made his way towards London.  James abdicated the throne in December of 1688 and in 
February of 1689 a parliamentary convention elevated William and Mary.61  When word arrived 
in Boston, on April 4, 1689, of James’ abdication, the colonists turned on Andros.  The city of 
Boston declared that all acts perpetrated by James and Andros were illegal and particular 
reprehension was reserved for the suspension of colonial assemblies which left the colonists 
without “liberty” and made them “slaves.”62  A mob surrounded Andros at his home in Boston 
and arrested him; they restored their charter’s government (though interestingly enough, not the 
charter itself), and sent the imprisoned Andros to England in 1690.63  Rebellion spread across the 
colonies.64  As calm eventually came over the colonies, the colonists reformed their colonial 
assemblies which became symbols of British constitutionalism in North America. 
 Parliament examined how it could protect itself from the encroaching nature of the 
monarchy.  With the parliamentary experience under James in mind, Parliament passed The 
                                                
61 This example demonstrates the delay in communication of the Glorious Revolution owed to 
the geographical gap between the colonies and England. 
62 Anon., “The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston and the 
county adjacent,” The American Republic: Primary Sources, ed. Bruce Frohnen (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), 101-105.  
63 Mary Lou Lustig, The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714 
(Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson, 2002), 216-22. 
64 One of the more significant rebellions that led to the establishment of a quasi-military 
dictatorship was Leisler’s Rebellion in New York. See Jerome R. Reich, Leisler’s Rebellion 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953).  
 Southard 24 
Declaration of Right.  “Whereas the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Comons assembled,” 
began the Declaration, “lawfully and freely representing all the Estates of the People of this 
Realme.”65  Parliament passed, and William consented to, an act that enshrined the contents of 
the Declaration of Right in law.  The 1689 Bill of Rights declined the monarch powers to 
suspend or dispense laws, raise taxes, or form a standing army without the consent of the 
Parliament.66  It symbolized the triumph of the liberties of Englishmen over the royal 
prerogative, a fight that started with the Magna Carta and that past parliaments had waged.  
 The 1689 English Bill of Rights marked a stark departure for Parliament and English 
history for another reason, though at the time the Lords and Commons did not know it.  
Parliament had protected Englishmen from the encroachment of the royal prerogative, claimed 
supremacy for itself, and as a result founded a new constitution of parliamentary command.  This 
supremacy fully revealed itself over the course of the next century after the 1688 Revolution and 
received its clearest articulation with regard to colonial affairs when the 1766 British Parliament 
asserted that it contained the power to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatsoever.  The 
Americans could not understand how the same institution that fought against tyranny in the 
monarchy could embrace tyranny in the assembly.  The events of the Glorious Revolution served 
as the basis for a new constitution of parliamentary supremacy over the Crown and over all of 
England.  The ascension of William and Mary to the English throne and the concurrent rise of 
the constitution of parliamentary supremacy, in theory and in practice, faced questions at home 
and in the British North American colonies in the 1760’s and 1770’s.  Most American did not 
dispute the fact that Parliament was sovereign, but they argued over whether or not this 
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newfound sovereignty was limitless in both legality and constitutionality.  To this point, John 
Phillip Reid has written, “the prerevolutionary Parliament was . . . supreme and beyond legal 
restraint, but not yet so supreme that everyone thought it and the constitution were one.”67 
 This experience remained fresh in the colonial imagination, as John Phillip Reid pointed 
out that the similarities between the treatment by James II in the 1680’s and Parliament in the 
1760’s were “obvious” to many.68  Though some in the eighteenth century accepted the doctrine 
of parliamentary supremacy, Englishmen in America, “whether whigs or tories” rejected that 
principle as “arbitrary government.”69  Colonists who visited England during the 1688 such as 
Massachusetts Puritan Increase Mather believed that the parliamentary privileges established by 
the Declaration of Rights extended to the colonies.70  The Glorious Revolution, complete with its 
declarations and elevation of a monarch, further created evidence that affirmed consent in 
government was integral to British constitutionalism and hearkened back to Coke’s enduring 
influence in law.71  In the colonies parliamentary sovereignty became force and command, due to 
the lack of influence the colonists had in the electoral process.72  
James Wilson: Mixed Government and the Anglo-American Constitution 
 Fifty-four years later, in 1742, Alison Lansdale and William Wilson welcomed James 
Wilson into the world in their section of Scotland’s Shire of Fife, a place known for its 
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“individualistic, eccentric, and self-sufficient” citizenry and its “tradition of insubordination to 
civil authority.”73  Together, they raised young Wilson to appreciate the Bible and the 
Presbyterian religion, while they encouraged him to accept the call to become a minister.  Wilson 
refused this call after spending a couple of years at the University of St. Andrews, where he grew 
intellectually and encountered the luminaries of the Scottish Enlightenment.  Wilson absorbed 
the ideas of the likes of David Hume and Adam Smith, but gravitated more towards the school of 
the Scottish Enlightenment represented by Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid.74  Like 
Hutcheson, Wilson believed in a philosophy that encouraged education as a means of attaining 
the knowledge of higher truths.  This pursuit led him away from his native Scotland, and he 
departed for the North American British Colonies, arriving in New York Harbor in 1765.  After a 
short time in New York, Wilson headed for a city that earned the name “The Cradle of Liberty” 
for its place in Revolutionary and Constitutional history: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  There, he 
attempted work as a tutor at the College of Philadelphia before abandoning that profession to 
read law under John Dickenson. 
 Wilson utilized the rhetoric of the Anglo-American customary constitution of the colonial 
experience throughout the 1760’s, but his most comprehensive grasp of the constitutionalism in 
which he lived appeared in his pamphlet, “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the 
Legislative Authority of the British Parliament.”  According to Bernard Bailyn, the first wave of 
revolutionary pamphlets focused primarily on discussions of the historical differences between 
the Colonies and England, and sought to convince their opponents of the correctness of their 
rejection of the constitution of parliamentary supremacy.75  Wilson’s pamphlet was published 
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during this first wave of pamphlets and the lawyer in him sought to persuade colonists and 
Britons of his view.  He postponed the publication of this pamphlet until 1774, when the 
revolutionary crisis was well underway.  In it, Wilson reacted against the British Parliamentary 
assumption that the authority to legislate for the colonies rested in England, and not in the 
colonies.  Wilson denied the position of William Blackstone that ultimate sovereignty rested in 
the British Parliament and became one of the first to deny parliamentary authority to legislate for 
both internal and external affairs.76  The pamphlet’s argument contained three major themes: 1) 
the rights of Englishmen under the British constitution; 2) the nature of mankind and the 
institutional mechanism of elections; and, 3) the relationship between British Parliament and 
Ireland. 
 Wilson wrote in the first lines of the pamphlet that he based his denial of parliamentary 
authority on “the principles of justice and freedom, and of the British constitution.”77  However, 
the constitution that he claimed was the customary tradition that the Anglo-Americans 
understood as their historical relationship to the British Parliament and the Crown.  Wilson 
appealed not to the doctrine of social contract or natural rights that emanated from a state of 
nature, but to the natural birth right of Englishmen in the British Empire, whether they resided in 
London or Boston.  “Can the Americans,” Wilson asked, “who are descended from British 
ancestors, and inherit all their rights be blamed - can they be blamed by their brethren in Britain 
- for claiming to still enjoy those rights?”78  Another Pennsylvanian echoed the zeitgeist of the 
age earlier in a 1764 pamphlet directed to the concerned public: “Was the blood of your 
ancestors polluted by a change of soil? Were they freemen in England and did they become 
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slaves by a six-week voyage to America?”79  Wilson asked a follow up question to those who 
claimed that British liberties did not extend to the Americans: “Is not our honor and virtue as 
pure, our liberty as valuable, our property as dear, our lives as precious here as in England?”80  
To Wilson, as to most Whigs, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty or supremacy was foreign to 
the Anglo-American customary constitution.  The same constitution established that the 
happiness of a society was the first law of every government and off of this assumption Wilson 
posed the following question: “Will it ensure and increase the happiness of the American 
colonies, that the parliament of Great Britain should possess a supreme, irresistible, uncontrolled 
authority over them?”81  Surely, he answered, it was not the case.  A change in the “imperial 
arrangement” by the king, the royal ministry, and Parliament was equivalent to “a breach of 
contract.”82 
 It is important to dwell for a moment on the use of the word “happiness.”  There is much 
debate over the use of this term by the leaders of the American Revolutionaries.  It could be, as 
historian Jack P. Greene has written, that unity and public virtue played a role in the late-
seventeenth century understanding of the term.83  Happiness to the American Whig, and more 
broadly to the eighteenth century mind, most often meant the acquisition of real property, or 
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land.84  Wilson discussed at length the link between property and society, or civilization, in his 
later law lectures.85   
 The next major argument that Wilson delivered was directed at the idea of representation 
and the institutional protections that elections provided for liberty. 
What an instructive example is this! How alarming to those, who have no 
influence over their legislators-who have no security but that the power, which 
was originally derived from the people, wand was delegated for their 
preservation, may be abused for their destruction! Kings are not the only tyrants: 
the conduct of the long parliament will justify me in adding, that kings are not the 
severest tyrants!86 
 
Indeed, Wilson believed that men fell from grace and that “[m]ankind are usually more affected 
with a near though inferior interest.”87  Wilson thought that Parliament had forgotten its own 
mixed constitutional order: that the outcome of the Glorious Revolution was not a supreme 
Parliament, liberated from all restraint, but a Parliament that checked the King, a King that 
checked the Parliament, and a House of Lords that checked the House of Commons, and a 
Commons that checked the Lords.  Thomas Jefferson echoed this perspective in his 1774 
Summary View of the Rights of British America, when he wrote that “history has informed us that 
bodies of men, as well as individuals, are susceptible of the spirit of tyranny.”88  Wilson analyzed 
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how the political order according to a supreme and sovereign Parliament removed a critical 
institutional mechanism from the hands of the colonists: frequent elections. 
 Elections formed the linchpin of the contract that the people of Britain created with 
Parliament and that the colonists created with their assemblies.  Wilson cited legal treatise writer 
William Blackstone, who wrote that the British constitution “supposes that parliaments may 
betray [the people’s] trust, and provides, as far as human wisdom can provide, that they may not 
be able to do so without long.”89  Due to elections, the people of Britain demonstrated their 
approval or disapproval of particular policies; the same was true of the colonists and their 
relationship to their colonial assemblies.  Through this process, “[t]he constitution is frequently 
renewed, and drawn back, as it were, to its first principles; which the most effectual method of 
perpetuating the liberties of a state.”90  It was through this process that the people provided their 
consent: “no one has a right to any authority over another without his consent.  All lawful 
government is founded on the consent of those who are subject to it.”91  If Parliament revoked 
colonial charters, abolished colonial assemblies, and legislated for the colonies from Great 
Britain, then “the temple of British liberty, like a structure of ice, would instantly dissolve.”92  
American Whigs tied ideas about consent, representation, and liberty together.  Comparatively, 
British Tories disagreed with these ideas and presented their alternative doctrine of virtual 
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representation.93  To the Tories, the Whig idea of consent meant that no law applied unless an 
individual personally voted in favor of it.94  Such an idea inevitably led to anarchy.  The 
American Whigs postponed answering these questions about representation in full until 
Constitutional Convention of 1787. 
 The example of Ireland’s experience with Parliamentary legislation provided further 
ammunition for Wilson’s pamphlet.  “[T]he people of Ireland were not bound by an act of 
parliament made in England,” Wilson argued, “The Irish did not send members to parliament; 
and, therefore, they were not bound by its acts.”95  According to John Phillip Reid, the colonial 
imagination noticed the Irish example after the passage of the 1765 Stamp Act and the 1767 
arrival of British troops in Boston harbor.96  Indeed, the idea that the colonists were not only the 
subject of the King, but of the Parliament gave rise to the idea that the colonists were subjects of 
subjects.97  Such an idea was incredulous to the colonists’ ideas about liberty and with a 
rhetorical flourish they asked – how could one subject be another’s superior when they were 
equal in England?  
 Wilson’s pamphlet denied the doctrine of parliament sovereignty over the colonies in full 
force.  The implications of his pamphlet included the idea that original sovereignty belonged to 
the people themselves.  A year later, in 1775, Wilson delivered a speech at convention in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  He argued that the colonists had exercised patience in the lingering 
disagreement regarding sovereignty.  He asked, “Were we rash or seditious? Did we betray want 
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of affection to our brethren in Britain?”98 After the 1766 repeal of the Stamp Act, the colonists 
were “lulled into delightful security,” but such security proved to be temporary, as Parliament 
“pursued their scheme of depriving [the colonists] of their property . . . and to degrade [them] to 
a rank inferior [sic] to that of freedmen.”99  Wilson walked his audience through the events of the 
past few years: the boycott against British goods, the 1766 declaratory act, and the 1773 tea tax.  
It infuriated the lawyer in Wilson that in Boston, men were rounded up without a court of their 
peers.  If these acts were allowed in Massachusetts, what prevented them from occurring in 
Pennsylvania?  The full blown conspiracy was revealed: “the colonists, it seems, must be stript 
[sic] of their judicial, as well as of their legislative powers. . . Their constitutions must be 
changed: their liberties must be abridged.”100   
 Though Reid has asserted that it must have confused, even angered, the adherents of 
Parliamentary supremacy that the colonists referred to an unwritten constitution, Wilson 
addressed those concerns through his legal acumen and erudition.101  He embraced the British 
customary constitution and threw the constitution of parliamentary supremacy into the air.   
Wilson looked back through English history and asked if the 1215 signing of the Magna Carta at 
Runnymede, the 1660 Restoration, the 1688 Glorious Revolution, were “authorized by the 
constitution.”102  Wilson went even further and claimed the mantle of those “venerable 
assemblies” and British liberty for the colonists.103  These acts and crimes amounted to a full-
fledged attack on the entirety of the North American British colonies, so Wilson argued.  The 
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outcome of these acts forced the colonists to discuss how to best move forward in light of the 
crisis of liberty in a convention. 
By this means, a chain – more inestimable, and, while the necessity for it 
continues, we hope, more indissoluble than one of gold - a chain of freedom has 
been formed, of which every individual in these colonies, who is willing to 
preserve the greatest of all human blessings, his liberty, has the pleasure of 
beholding himself a link.104 
 
However, even with the meeting of the Continental Congress, Wilson held out hope that this 
crisis was temporary and that nowhere had colonials given separation from Great Britain a 
serious thought.  He proceeded to read a proposal to the assembly that condemned the 1774 acts 
of Parliament and George III to punish Boston for the December 1773 Boston Tea Party as well 
as stated that it was the duty of British citizens to resist those unreasonable actions. 
 Reaffirming his findings in “Considerations,” Wilson found no authority for Parliament 
to alter colonial constitutions and declared, “We do not send members to the British Parliament; 
we have parliaments of our own.”105  This argument roiled royalists as it asserted that the 
colonial assemblies were co-equal with the British Parliament.  Unlike other countries, Wilson 
stated that “an original contract” between the British people and government was formed by the 
Glorious Revolution and that event enacted principles of limited government against the King 
and that no such right ever existed in Parliament’s purview.106  In summation, Wilson called the 
arguments against the colonists “an enchanted castle,” that “never had any real existence,” once 
the “genuine rays of liberty and of the constitution dart[ed] in.”107 
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 The last document Wilson authored during the Revolutionary era he co-authored in 1776 
at the Continental Congress with other delegates, including his legal mentor John Dickenson, 
William Hooper, James Duane and Robert Alexander.108  In February, months before the 
publication of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, this group wrote that “all Power was 
originally in the People,” and that this power included that delegated to Parliament and the 
King.109  It stated that the colonial assemblies were co-equal with the House of Commons and 
that the latter body could not have “any Power deriv’d from the Inhabitants of these Colonies.”110  
The address reiterated similar arguments that Wilson made in his speech in Pennsylvania – at 
some points using the exact same language.  The men pledged their allegiance to the British 
government, but held something marginally higher than their allegiance to England: Liberty.  
They thundered, “We are desirous to continue Subjects: But we are determined to continue 
Freemen. . . .That the Colonies may continue connected, as they have been, with Britain, is our 
second Wish: Our first is – that America may be free.”111  
IV. Wilson’s Constitutional Era 
 
 Within the first decades of independence, a group of revolutionaries realized that the 
Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation could not provide an effective governing 
structure.  The general sense of the Confederation was that it was structurally weak in dealing 
with the issues of the critical period.112  The loose Confederation government placed enormous 
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power in the hands of legislative assemblies, as the place where Americans had historically 
governed themselves.  According to Gordon Wood, Madison and others believed that state 
assemblies were incompetent in the ability to execute the laws they passed.113  An anonymous 
editorial in the Daily Advertiser of New York ran, “The necessity of the Convention has been 
generally admitted and almost universally felt.”114  The first essay in the Federalist stated that 
“nothing less than the existence of the UNION” was at stake.115   It was in this environment that 
the Continental Congress directed states to form a revision of the Articles of Confederation.  
Wilson arrived to the Convention on May 14, 1787 with his ideas about representation from the 
colonial and revolutionary experiences and fellow Pennsylvania delegates Robert Morris, 
Thomas Fitz Simmons, and Gouverneur Morris.116  The notion that the true authority of 
government originated in the people and that the governed expressed their consent through 
elections found no better advocate than James Wilson at the Philadelphia Convention.  Indeed 
Wilson proved himself one the most important influences on the Constitution and according to 
James Read Wilson was “second only to Madison.”117  He had achieved prominence during the 
Revolution through his association with Dickenson and limited interaction with Benjamin 
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Franklin, but he further increased his profile through his service in the Continental Congress and 
the publication of a 1785 essay titled “Considerations on the Bank of North America.”118 
 In his second “Considerations,” Wilson argued that Congress held the implied power to 
charter a national bank and denied the authority of his fellow Pennsylvanians to interfere in the 
execution of its actions.  His concept of implied powers extended to “general rights, general 
powers, and general obligations” that “resulted from the union” of all of the states under the 
Articles of Confederation.119  This union contained all the powers that the laws of nations were 
implicit in the nature of national governments.  As Bradley Caffee has noted, an increase of 
implied powers under the Articles of Confederation never occurred, the majority of 
representatives believing the Articles did not allow for a strong central government and that a 
policy of implied powers could “quickly slip into arbitrary power and a new parliamentary 
tyranny.”120  This crisis demanded more than legislation passed by the Congress; the Congress 
needed a stronger foundation of authority and a mechanism to carry out Congressional orders.  In 
September 1786, concerned state delegates made an effort to meet in Annapolis to discuss a 
revision of the Articles but seeing as only five states attended the Annapolis Convention, the 
group moved to discuss more general revisions to the Articles in Philadelphia the following year, 
1787.  When Wilson arrived at the Philadelphia Convention, his position on the limits on the 
power of government was clear.  Wilson’s ideas about the proposed federal government and his 
opposition to a federal bill of rights found a home with the “court-party nationalists” and became 
“the basis of all Federalist thinking” through his debates at Convention and his position on the 
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Committee of Revision for the final document.121  The question remained: on what authority 
would this new foundation rest? 
The True Locus of Sovereignty  
 The location and nature of sovereignty in the colonies was a discussion that the Whigs 
postponed during the Revolution, at least in the formal, constitutional sense.122   As distinguished 
historian Forrest McDonald has written, the Declaration of Independence was “ambiguous” 
about sovereignty and the thinkers of the eighteenth century understood the term as “the absolute 
power to command anything and everything that was naturally possible.”123  Prominent lawyers 
and other learned men obsessed over the location of sovereignty as “the most important 
theoretical question” before the 1787 Convention.124  As Wilson demonstrated in convention, he 
formulated the most comprehensive answer to the question.  He thought that the neither the 
Declaration nor history was ambiguous in this matter: the people were sovereign.125  As a result 
of this thinking he gravitated to the idea of popular elections, easily one of the most recognizable 
features of the Anglo-American customary constitution. 
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 Wilson argued for the formation of a popularly elected bicameral legislature and a large 
one at that.126  Most of the delegates at the Convention agreed in the propriety of an immediate 
election for the lower house of the national legislature; however, some delegates hesitated  to 
embrace the idea of immediate elections for the upper house.  “The people,” said Roger Sherman 
of Connecticut, “should have as little to do as may be about the Government.”127  Elbridge Gerry 
of Massachusetts attributed most “evils” under the Articles to an “excess of democracy.”128  
Wilson thought that the new “federal pyramid” he envisioned required the “broadest base 
possible” of direct support from the people and that the independence of the upper house 
depended upon the same principles of a wide base of input from the voters in this “pyramid of 
government.”129  He espoused proportional representation based on population not only for the 
House, but also for the Senate.  His fundamental belief being that sovereignty resided in the 
people and the colonial experience at hand, he proposed that the Convention ought to establish 
national districts for the election of Senators.  Wilson was not clear about the structure of these 
hypothetical federal districts, but it seemed he intended for voters among several states, or 
sections of several states, to vote for a Senator.  This method of election structured a reliance on 
the people, yet it provided a different constituency than the voters in the local districts for House 
of Representatives.  This proposal did not obtain much support among the other delegates for 
representation in Congress.  Indeed, no other delegate commented on Wilson’s idea save for 
Madison who anticipated that the proposal only served to further exacerbate the perception that 
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the Convention sought to diminish the power of smaller states.130  When Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina moved later in the Convention to again grant the mode of election to the state 
legislatures, Wilson continued in his disposition that the “vigorous authority to flow immediately 
from the legitimate source of all authority.”131  Though Wilson lost the battle for proportional 
popularly elected representation in the Senate with the June 5 draft of the Constitution created by 
a select committee, he continued to offer his arguments for popular elections in other aspects of 
the new government as he did for the Presidency.  
 Wilson argued that precedent already existed for the popular election of single 
executives.  He looked to the popularly elected governors in New York and Massachusetts as 
cases that proved the immediate election of a single executive by the people was the ideal 
method of selection for the executive as “the best safeguard against tyranny.”132  “Extend the 
sphere,” Madison wrote about congressional elections in the extended republic in November 
1787, “and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests.”133  Wilson’s defense of a 
popularly elected presidency was rooted in the same principle, but where Madison argued for 
this principle in the legislative branch Wilson supported its incorporation into the executive 
branch as well.  In time, the Convention agreed to a modification of Wilson’s federal district 
proposal as a blueprint for the Electoral College.  Sherman disagreed with Wilson’s pleas for a 
single executive, citing that most of the state legislatures established governor’s councils to 
represent the people in the governor’s office.134  Wilson did not believe such a council necessary 
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and articulated a theory of checks and balances that insisted on the single executive’s reliance 
upon a national popular election every three years before he condemned the folly that of a plural 
executive.  He cited the leadership experience of Rome with Julius Caesar and Augustus in the 
triumvirates to demonstrate the tendency of one in a plural executive to “become the master of 
his colleagues.”135  “Among three equal members,” Wilson argued that governance would sink to 
“[uncontrolled], continued, & violent animosities; which would . . . diffuse their poison thro’ the 
other branches of Govt, thro’ the States, and at length thro’ the people at large.”136  A young 
Alexander Hamilton found common ground with Wilson on this point in the Convention and 
later echoed the sentiment in Federalist 70 when he wrote for the need of “energy” as being 
critical to the preservation of political liberty.137   
 Wilson also argued that his popularly elected executive could protect the Union from 
tyranny only if the office came with the powers that allowed the executive to reject law that 
passed the legislature.  Wilson agreed in the necessity of “an absolute negative” on law that came 
out of the legislative branch, but believed that the judiciary deserved revisionary power as 
well.138  Once more Sherman rose in opposition, as he thought it was wrong to allow “one man to 
obstruct the will of the whole.”139  Wilson expected the use of an executive veto to be rare, as the 
sheer threat of rejection would prevent the Congress from passing legislation that the President 
disliked.  An additional power that Wilson tried to grant the national government was a federal 
veto of state laws.  Though he was successful in securing a presidential veto in the final version 
of the Constitution, he did not achieve a wider grant for the national government of state law, or 
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revisionary power for the judiciary.140  These opinions in checking the power of the legislature 
placed Wilson in a position that his critics used to call him an aristocrat and anti-democratic.141  
 Wilson also engaged in the debate over the status and representation of African slaves 
under the new government established by the Constitution.  The admission of slaves as three-
fifths of a person confused him and he “did not well see on what principle the admission blacks 
in the proportion of three fifths could be explained.  Are they admitted as Citizens? then why are 
they not admitted as on an equality with White Citizens? are they admitted as property? then why 
is not other property admitted into the computation?”142  It should be clear that he agreed to the 
three-fifths clause as matter of political expedience to keep the southern states at the Convention 
and did not in any way advocate for race equality.  However, his comments shed light on how 
the delegates at the Convention struggled to make sense of the institution of slavery in the new 
government.  It was curious, as Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts commented, that when 
discussing taxation the southern states argued that slaves were inferior to freedmen, but when 
discussing representation they were equal.143 
The Revolution, the Constitution, and National Identity 
 In the midst of Wilson’s comments at convention, another theme presented itself in his 
comments: an antagonism towards the states and their respective claims of sovereignty by the 
Anti-Federalists.  Massachusetts delegate Rufus King articulated the Federalist sentiment well 
when he said, “The States were not ‘sovereigns’ in the sense contended for by some. They did 
                                                
140 The United States Supreme Court has developed a revisionary power over both the executive 
and legislative branches through the process of judicial review that allows the Court to uphold or 
deny the constitutionality of laws. There was general agreement during the Convention that this 
power would exist.  
141 Hall, Political Philosophy of James Wilson, 127-138.   
142 Ibid., 587.  
143 Ibid., 580.  
 Southard 42 
not posses the peculiar features of sovereignty. They could not make war, nor peace, nor 
alliances, nor treaties.  Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not 
speak to any forign [sic] sovereign whatever.”144  To this position, some in Convention claimed 
that in declaring independence the states entered a state of nature.  Wilson could not stomach the 
assertion and responded by reading the Declaration of Independence, noting that the phrase 
“United Colonies” was used.145  He feared that the proponents of state sovereignty wished to 
mire the proposed government in local interests, when they were actually “one nation of 
brethren.”146  Unlike Hamilton, Wilson believed that the states and new national government 
could exist on kind terms with one another.147  Another facet of the sovereign people can be 
recognized in Wilson’s defense of the special ratifying conventions that he and Madison 
championed.  Madison believed that the ratification of the proposed Constitution by the people 
was “essential” and that any option that placed control of ratification in the hands of the states 
would lead to the idea that the states were sovereign entities.148  Such a doctrine might lead to the 
destruction of the Union with “a breach of any one article, by any of the parties.”149  Wilson 
agreed, and floated the idea that a “partial union” of the states that ratified the Constitution 
would be open to the admission of the other states at a later time.150 
 Once Wilson left the Convention, he lobbied for the adoption of the Constitution in 
Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention where he clashed with Anti-Federalists.  No issue divided 
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists more than the debate surrounding the lack of a national bill 
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of rights in the new document.  To this end, Wilson delivered one of the most impassioned 
Federalist speeches of the era in the Pennsylvania State Court House Yard on October 6, 1787, in 
which he dismantled the Anti-Federalist argument about the need for a federal bill of rights.151  
Though Wilson held an expansive view of the implied powers of government, as demonstrated 
by his 1785 “Considerations” pamphlet regarding the implicit power of the Articles to charter a 
bank, he dismissed Anti-Federalists fears that “the different state constitutions are repealed and 
entirely done away” by the ratification of the Constitution.152  On the contrary, Wilson argued 
that the existence of the national government depended upon the existence of the states through 
the grant of power to them for the selection of Senators and electors to the Electoral College.153  
 Three explanations can be offered for what looked like a contradiction in Wilson’s 
thinking.  One of the justifications he presented in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention was 
that many of the other delegates present at the Philadelphia Convention simply did not think a 
bill of rights necessary.154  Secondly, he and other Federalists argued that including a bill of 
rights in the federal government served not to protect the people, but rather to take away power 
from them.  “A bill of rights,” Wilson remarked, “annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of 
the powers reserved.”155  Wilson and other leaders at the time had no way of knowing what 
would be included in a bill of rights and expressed that as contrary to the implicit grant of power 
to state governments under the Articles of Confederation, “the positive grant expressed in the 
instrument of Union” through the ratifying conventions allowed the people to reserve their 
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power.156  It doubled as a political argument that Federalists could utilize against the Anti-
Federalists.157  The claim of state sovereignty by Anti-Federalists assumed that the people were 
not the true foundation of authority and this odious argument stunned Federalists like Wilson. 
Thirdly, Wilson espoused an optimistic belief that the new government and frequent elections 
structured the people’s affiliations in a way that kept the government in touch with the principles 
of the Anglo-American customary constitution.  The defense provided by frequent elections – the 
choice to grant a leader office or not – offered more protection of political and civil liberty than 
the parchment barriers created by a bill of rights.  In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, he 
acknowledged the importance of the 1215 Magna Charta and the 1689 Declaration of Right, but 
the existence of these documents did not ensure the King or Parliament’s adherence to the 
principles embodied by those documents.158  The Revolution was unnecessary if passing 
resolutions protected the principles of civil and political liberty.  This third argument seems 
naïve, but the fact that within the two decades the people of the United States initiated the 
systematic obliteration of the Federalist Party over the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts might serve 
as evidence to make Wilson’s argument more credible in his context: that the people were 
capable of ridding themselves of illiberal leaders when they rose to power.159  To the twenty first 
century mind, Wilson’s logic appears not only weak, but also difficult to understand.  To him, in 
his historical context, however, the logic was clear. 
 Wilson took to comparing the 1787 Federal Constitution to Great Britain’s in one of his 
lectures he delivered between 1791 and 1792 at the University of Pennsylvania.  He harangued 
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against Parliament’s claim of supremacy that ignited the Revolution.  Wilson denied Great 
Britain the title of constitutional government with his statement that “no such thing as a 
constitution, properly so called, is known in Great Britain. What is known, in that kingdom, 
under that name, instead of being the controller and the guide, is the creature and the dependent 
of the legislative power.”160  The Americans threw off this arbitrary feature of government that 
existed in the British system through the Revolution.  Wilson roundly criticized Blackstone, who 
believed that the British Parliament could not be limited and every law it enacted was as 
constitutional.  In the United States, under the Constitution, the legislature was ideally beholden 
to an institutional check upon its power: the judiciary.  Beaming at the ingenuity of the system, 
Wilson exclaimed, “[an] effectual provision is made, that the transgression of [legislative] 
bounds shall be adjudged and rendered vain and fruitless.  What a noble guard against legislative 
despotism!”161 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) 
 Wilson’s contributions to Federalist thinking did not stop with his attendance at the 
Constitutional Convention or Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention.  In 1789, President George 
Washington appointed and the Senate approved Wilson as an Associate Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court.  Wilson again confronted the sovereign state argument in the case 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793).  With the Constitution enacted, he appealed to its text in order to 
rebut Georgia’s claim that nonresident citizens lacked standing to sue states in which they did 
not live.  The events of that case dated back to 1777, when South Carolinian merchant Robert 
Farquhar sold wartime supplies to Georgia representatives Thomas Stone and Edward Davies for 
revolutionary forces stationed in Savannah.  Farquhar delivered the goods, but never received 
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payment even though he requested payment multiple times until 1784.  In that year Farquhar 
suffered an unfortunate incident that led to his drowning at sea.  Farquhar’s will named 
Alexander Chisholm as an executor of the estate and, in 1777, Chisholm sued Georgia for the 
payment of goods that Farquhar delivered.  Chisholm first filed in district court and the presiding 
justices in Georgia ruled that a citizen of South Carolina could not sue a state where the plaintiff 
did not reside.  Chisholm appealed to the United States Supreme Court, seeking a remedy for his 
injury.  In a political stunt, Georgia refused to appear before the Supreme Court after repeated 
invitations to argue their case that the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court did not 
extend to matters of state sovereignty.162  
 In a four to one opinion, the justices ruled that Georgia and all other states were subject to 
the authority of the Constitution, including the judicial oversight of Article III.  Associate Justice 
Wilson systematically admonished Georgia.  He framed the opinion of the Court in a question, 
“[D]o the people of the United States form a Nation?”163  Wilson knew that in the United States 
the origin of governmental authority stemmed from the citizens that lived under it and drew on 
the Scottish Enlightenment, Natural Law, the Anglo-American customary constitution, the 
Revolution, and the 1787 Constitution.  Wilson bellowed, “To the Constitution of the United 
States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have 
been used with propriety. . . . [The Ratifiers] might have announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ 
people of the United States.”164  In the latter pages of the opinion, Wilson continued articulating 
his view that when the people of the United States enacted the Constitution, they enacted the 
entire document.  The people, he insisted, meant to empower the legislature with legislative 
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power, the executive with executive power, and in this case, the judiciary with judicial review.  
“The people of the United States,” Wilson wrote, “intended to form themselves into a nation for 
national purposes.”165 
 By reading Wilson’s thoughts on the nature of those who ratified the Constitution in the 
ratifying conventions in the late 1790’s, one can see glimmers of the nationalist sentiment he 
expressed at the Philadelphia Convention and even back to his thoughts on the Bank of North 
America.  In Chisholm, Wilson concluded “that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon 
the large scale of the Union, as a part of the ‘People of the United States,’ did not surrender the 
Supreme or Sovereign Power to that State but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to 
themselves.  As to the purposes of the Union, therefore Georgia, is NOT a sovereign state.”166  
With the forceful declaration from the bench, Wilson quieted the debate (at least for some time) 
on the issue of state sovereignty.  It was the theory expanded by Jefferson and Madison with the 
1798/99 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in response to Adam’s Alien and Sedition Acts, 
intensified with the 1832 Nullification Crisis, and endorsed by John C. Calhoun in the 1830’s to 
justify the rebellion of southern states in the Union over the issue of slavery.  Though with the 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment the states nulled the Chisholm opinion, Wilson, Chief 
Justice John Marshall, President Andrew Jackson, and President Abraham Lincoln stood against 
this argument of the sovereignty of the states and the so-called Compact Theory of the Union. 
V. Conclusion 
 The political and legal thought of James Wilson is saturated with Natural Law influences, 
as demonstrated by a read of his law lectures, but the purpose of this essay was to argue the equal 
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importance of Wilson’s Anglo-American customary constitutional arguments during the 
prerevolutionary, revolutionary, and constitutional eras.  As the product of multiple intellectual 
influences, Wilson was a complex individual.  He articulated a steadfast belief that the 
constitution was rooted in 1) the mixed constitutional order expressed by Coke and the 1688 
Glorious Revolution, and 2) the British colonial experience in North America.  American Whigs 
during the Revolution identified their colonial assemblies and elections as symbols of an 
inextricable constitutional tradition of representation and liberty.  Wilson personified these ideas 
and he was one of the few Whigs who appealed to these traditions to disavow British 
Parliamentary authority in the colonies and then attempted to enshrine these political and 
constitutional concepts in the 1787 Federal Constitution.  His efforts continued in his 
jurisprudence as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and his ideas 
regarding the sovereignty of the people of the United States resonate today.  Wilson dedicated 
his life to the preservation of liberty and constitutionalism in law; the importance of which he 
declared in his law lectures, “it is only under a good constitution that liberty – the precious gift of 
heaven – can be enjoyed and secured.”167 
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